POWER & MORALITY IN GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION

Soedjatmoko

First Morgenthau Memorial Lecture
on
Morality & Foreign Policy

With an Exchange Between
Soedjatmoko
and His Audience

Distinguished Lecture series:

Human Rights & Foreign Policy
by Hans J. Morgenthau

Toleration in Religion & Politics
by Adam Watson
on behalf of Sir Herbert Butterfield

Ethics & Foreign Policy
by Donald E. McHenry

ISBN: 0-87641-219-3

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Introduction

With the first Morgenthau Memorial Lecture we honor the memory of Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, who died on July 19, 1980. We honor his unique intellectual contribution to discussions of the role of ethics and morality in the conduct of foreign policy. His legacy includes the literally legions of men and women who studied with him at such institutions as the University of Chicago and the New School for Social Research in New York, and his classic textbook, *Politics Among Nations* (in its fifth printing), still the primary beacon for the teaching of international relations.

Professor Morgenthau was a CRIA trustee and chairman of the editorial board of our monthly magazine, *Worldview,* from 1962 until his death. About ten years ago I had the opportunity to bring together Professor Morgenthau and the present lecturer, Soedjatmoko. Unfortunately I do not recall any of the profound remarks exchanged as we sat over dinner in a good French restaurant – surely there were some! – but I do remember the evening as lively and pleasant. The two eminent guests enjoyed each other's company.

That occasion adds to our pleasure in having Soedjatmoko deliver the first of these memorial lectures. Previously the lectures were called the Distinguished CRIA Lecture on Morality and Foreign Policy. Three years ago Professor Morgenthau himself gave the first such lecture, followed by Sir Herbert Butterfield and, last year, Ambassador Donald F. McHenry.

Soedjatmoko is addressing the subject of "Power and Morality in Global Transformation." He has long pondered the question of economic development, especially in Third World countries, and has had an extraordinary career in the service of his own country, Indonesia, and of the United Nations – at present as rector of the

United Nations University in Tokyo. Soedjatmoko has raised the alarm about the millions of poor who have suffered economic, social, and cultural deprivation unto the fourth and fifth generations. They now are on the edge of becoming a permanent subclass of humanity.

Soedjatmoko has perceived the need for carefully thought out economic programs tailored to these countries. Modernization and economic development designed to change the conditions of deprivation must conform to the indigenous truths of individual cultures if there is to be progress for the many and not just for the few. As he puts it: "The religio-cultural substratum in which prevailing value configurations are rooted constitutes the inescapable baseline from which modernization will have to start if it is to have any permanent effect at all and if it is not to become a superficial and temporary aberration in a long process of historical continuity or stagnation. . . . The search for solutions in keeping with religio-cultural norms initially may retard the development process and the rate of growth. On the other hand, history has shown the magnitude of the political costs incurred when the traditional sectors are allowed to fall behind in the development process."

The theme of this lecture, then, is one of the dominant ones of the CRIA program. It is also especially close to the heart of Randolph Compton, chairman of the Compton Foundation, which has generously supported all of these lectures.

Robert J. Myers
President, CRIA

Power & Morality in Global Transformation

SOEDJATMOKO

I am highly honored to have been invited to give this Morgenthau memorial lecture. While I had the opportunity of personally meeting Hans Morgenthau on only one occasion, he has had a profound influence on my international thinking and I consider him to have been one of my important intellectual mentors in that area.

I turned to Morgenthau's writings for guidance many years ago, when the Indonesian Revolution first thrust me into the international arena and the United Nations Security Council in 1947. I have read him voraciously ever since. His wisdom and insights as they evolved over the years have greatly sustained me in my efforts to better understand the forces that shape our lives in this complex and changing world. As you know, he gave the first in this series of lectures to the Council on Religion and International Affairs, so I feel doubly honored to have been asked to continue in his footsteps.

We are met here, a few days short of the first anniversary of Hans Morgenthau's death, to pay respect to the intellectual and ethical legacy of a man who saw power and morality as inescapably interlinked. I thought it would be an appropriate occasion, therefore, to reflect on this relationship and its implications for the process of transformation which characterizes global society today.

One of the most important things we must learn if we are to survive and progress in this increasingly insecure, perilous, and fragile world is the art of existing, possibly at double population density, in a continuing state of rapid social change accompanied by a great common vulnerability and a new sense of limits.

Humankind's hopes of entering the next century as a viable, just, and equitable world community hang on our ability to manage our lives at such a rate of change.

This immense process of transformation has brought to the fore a number of ethical dilemmas with which we must wrestle in seeking to determine how we should use power most wisely. The very fact of change itself is an important consideration of one of these dilemmas, for it raises the profound moral question of how we are going to allow inevitable change to occur without drifting into chaos and violence. What actions could be considered morally acceptable to keep a measure of order and stability, all the while continuing a march toward a new and more just international order?

A particular imperative is the need to make this swift process of global transformation less frightening. It has been observed by my good friend Kenneth Thompson that when historians come to try to sort out afterwards why a war started, most often they find fear a major factor. After the next conflict we may not have the hindsight of historians, since the stockpiling of nuclear weapons poses the ultimate threat of extinction of all life on this planet. We therefore dare not become prisoners of fear, striking out at shadows. We simply must find ways to live and manage our fears in a condition in which all countries, strong or weak, will have to accept a high level of vulnerability as an inevitable feature of global interdependence.

The urgency of this need is further underscored by the world's growing capacity to inflict violence and destruction – in sheer number of arms as well as in their increasingly deadly sophistication. With the means to maim and kill our fellow men and women becoming more numerous and more easily acquired, violence – by individuals, groups, or, indeed, by society at large – has become a common feature of our daily lives.

The spread of nuclear weapons is increasingly likely, and their possible proliferation has now led to the use of violent force against that perceived threat. Everywhere we look around the globe we see appalling evidence that violence begets further violence.

The reality – or should we say pathology – of the world as an armed camp confronts us with some of our most wrenching ethical dilemmas. The issue is one of unilateral nuclear disarmament versus the development and emplacement of tactical nuclear weapons: Basically it asks the question whether or not, under certain conditions of perceived vulnerability and threat, certain nuclear weapons are morally justifiable. To what level of deadliness and destruction would we accept such justification? These are certainly questions, no matter how ugly they seem, that any student of Morgenthau's analyses of power and morality is compelled to ask.

The developing countries face particular kinds of moral dilemmas born out of the same sense of vulnerability and the quest for security. Should they, for example, pursue development with all economic resources at their command, even at the sacrifice of freedom, or must they devote scarce foreign exchange to the purchase of arms and the build-up of their military? If arm they must, how far up the ladder of destruction should their arms reach to ensure a sense of self-protection?

In a world which tends to answer such disquieting questions with increasing militarism, surely the time has come to think about more relevant concepts of security – ones which offer the hope of domestic freedom and international peace at lower levels of armaments.

We need, for example, to evolve more effective methods of conflict resolution that are not based on the implied threat of the use of violence. Ways should be devised to make more transparent the actions considered by nations against real or perceived threats – which is to say that nations must develop a greater ability and willingness to communicate with one another. We ought to encourage more deliberate efforts to correlate the national interests of countries at the international as well as at the regional level and to cooperate in works for peace – like the development of international or regional hydropower for the generation of electricity and irrigation. Above all, we need to reduce the great structural disparities, at both the national and international level, which are such relentless breeders of violence.

All of these would be important steps in enhancing our capacity to use power more wisely and more humanely than we have in the past and would be grounded in the perception that there must be voluntary limits to the application of power. This is a vital need at a time when conflicts can be waged with such terrifying and deadly weaponry and can engage the emotions of whole populations.

But I fear that we will not develop this capacity for wiser use of power unless and until we also come to recognize and adopt a set of shared human values – values that honor both the rich diversity and the overarching universality of our global society; unless, in short, we learn to undergird our use of power with morality, a central thrust of Hans Morgenthau's philosophy.

I have been rereading some of Morgenthau's works in recent weeks, and have been struck anew with the continuing importance he assigns to morality as power's ethical guidepost – that which gives power legitimacy and acceptable meaning and purpose. What Morgenthau demanded of morality, however, was that it be grounded in the day-to-day operations of the real world: "The choice [he stressed in *In Defense of the National Interest*] is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality, and another set of principles *derived from* political reality."

Note that Morgenthau did not say "depending upon," but "derived from" political reality. Thus his is no endorsement of situational morality but, rather, a call for a set of workable ethical standards to help guide humanity's efforts to regulate its affairs.

But what are we to consider "workable" in today's world of fragmentation, drift, and danger? The old world system – where the individual interests of nations worked to determine a more or less stable set of regulations, based on a given order and accepted legal rules of the game – simply is no longer viable or, in the view of a large part of humankind, morally acceptable. That system may have served the interests of certain powerful states and provided a workable, if often uneasy, balance of power, but it is in no

way reconciled to the emerging hopes and aspirations of the many hundreds of millions of the marginalized and voiceless around the globe, some of whom are on the move and are beginning to assert themselves. It is not a workable model for a world caught in the turmoil of inexorable, fundamental change, groping for a more just, humane, and equitable order.

In attempting to come to terms with the conflicting demands and goals that this search for a new order will inevitably encounter, we will again be confronted with a number of ethical problems. They have to do with the actions and the roles of the various actors on the international scene and the trade-offs they will have to make. When, for example, is a nation morally justified in taking certain actions in its self-interest which jeopardize international peace? Is it morally acceptable in today's world for any country to act unilaterally in response to unilaterally perceived threats to its own security? As the growth rate of the world economy slows down, which nations or which segments of society should bear the heavier burden of adjustment – the rich or the poor, the strong or the weak?

Of course none of these situations is new to history. What is new, however, is their urgency, the breadth of their implications, and the frequency with which we are likley to encounter them as our populations grow, our resources are depleted, and the expectations of more and more people continue to mount. Unless we are able to find the means to answer these sorts of deep moral dilemmas in just and equitable fashion, the present crisis in the world system will certainly become all the more acute.

Implicit in our capacity to find these answers, I believe, is the notion that we can no longer afford the luxury of separate moral standards and values tailored to the perceptions and ideologies of separate societies or cultures. With interdependence and technology opening virtually all national boundaries to the flow of information and ideas and increasing the impact of decisions made outside one's national borders, standards will have to be fashioned and adopted that are acceptable across a wide spectrum of cultures

and ideologies. Embodied in these standards will be the notion of the human species as a single and indivisible but pluralistic unit comprising the global society in all its cultural, social, racial, and religious diversity.

The urgency of our need to develop such standards becomes particularly apparent when one considers the other side of the coin of power in today's world – not its frightening ability to unleash unlimited destruction and violence, but its increasingly apparent inability to resolve a growing number of problems of our age.

All societies, the strong and the weak, are now exposed to many forces and processes beyond their control. Power and military might, it is increasingly evident, are unable to command authority or to impose any particular ideology – or to provide any lasting solutions to problems.

Power has shown itself incapable of coping with the many inexorable forces of social change and profound shifts in values that are upsetting the political equilibrium both nationally and internationally. And power, it seems, has little or nothing to do with our ability to stabilize the international economic scene.

There are also problems of massive population movements within and across national boundaries of developing as well as industrialized countries – by migrant workers, illegal immigrants, refugees, and others. These problems too cannot be solved by power alone. All signs point to one inescapable fact: No one is in control and no longer can one nation or group of nations chart the course of the world.

The industrialized countries are experiencing great political and economic difficulties in adjusting to the growing industrialization of the South and the shifting configuration of economic power. Their political and social institutions – political party machines, trade unions, and government bureaucracies – were created largely as respones to other, older problems than those we face today. Aggravating these difficulties are very profound cultural and value changes that affect basic attitudes toward nuclear arms, nuclear energy, and environmental degradation, or are manifested in such things as the search for new life-styles, the rise of a new religiosity,

and altered concepts of work.

The Third World countries evince equal fragmentation, disarray, and swirling force for change. They are caught up in sharp conflict – socially, politically, economically, and culturally – both at home and abroad.

Just where all this fragmentation and change is taking us may at times be extremely difficult to discern, for it often appears to be pulling in opposite directions. For instance, consider the rise of interest in religion. In some of its manifestations this can be read as a healthy searching for the transcendent in human life, as the reassertion of the human person as a moral being, and perhaps as the beginning of the perception of need for human values that can encompass humankind's wide diversity. In other forms, however, the new religiosity seems bent on imposing the views and beliefs of a particular group on the larger society – of turning away from true morality and espousing its mirror opposites, moral self-righteousness and intolerance. We need to search for ways to match this greater religiosity with a greater capacity for tolerance.

Whatever the current forces for change now at play, a great many of them seem rooted in the vast global disparities that abandon hundreds of millions around the globe to lives of squalor, injustice, and despair.

The need to balance the requirements for effective development strategies with respect for justice and liberty; to balance the right of participation of the hitherto marginalized millions with the urgencies of efficiency; to balance the use of resources for development with the general need to protect the earth's life-support systems; and to avoid the conflicting requirements of access, rate of use, and control of natural resources developing into a new "geopolitics of resources" in which once again the weak will be manipulated and exploited – these are some of the moral dilemmas we have to face in a more crowded, competitive, and limited world.

Whatever solutions we turn to – whether in attempting to cope with hunger, energy demand, environmental degradation, or rapid population growth – the ultimate answers are not going to come

from only the experts and the technocrats. They will arise from our ability to relate their recommendations to the hopes, interests, and aspirations of those who until now have been marginalized and powerless.

New patterns of food distribution and consumption, new allocations of energy and other resources, new configurations of power, new concepts of work and leisure time – all, in the long run, will be ultimately fashioned out of countless millions of decisions by individuals around the globe, decisions made within the perspectives of their own cultural values, societal customs, and moral guidelines.

Neat and tidy packages prepared by experts to describe the appropriate future energy "mix" will avail us little unless they are socially and culturally acceptable to the people being asked to use these packages and make them part of their daily lives. We have seen how attempts to include a nuclear component in a country's energy scenario have already threatened or actually brought about the fall of governments. The option of what kinds of energy to use must be seen as essentially a political and cultural choice, not merely a technological one.

So too with management of the environment it will be the small day-to-day decisions by individuals that ultimately will count the most. The decision, for example, by millions of individual farmers and villagers that they must cut down another tree to cook their food or heat their home is the kind of choice that will ultimately determine the ecological well-being of this planet. We must find ways to incorporate the reality of such decisions – ones that touch intimately on daily human existence – in our scientific and technological planning.

Clearly, then, science and technology alone are not going to provide the answers to the new kinds of problems we are facing. They will have to be firmly rooted in the customs and mores of local cultures and societies. They will have to take account of new perceptions of the problems by new generations rising to take their place in society. Out of all this, new solutions, speaking to real needs, will have to be fashioned.

Science and technology alone cannot help us to reshape the social structures in which hunger, poverty, and injustice are embedded unless we strive to make science and technology serve social and ethical purposes. Those of us who are concerned about a more humane, just, and secure world would do well to remember Morgenthau's counsel in *Science: Servant or Master?* that "the ultimate decisions that confront the scientific mind are . . . not intellectual but moral in nature."

To make such decisions, however, we will need to know a great deal more than we do now about the myriad social and cultural elements of the problems we face. We need, for example, to know more about the dynamics of community participation, village self-management, and farmers' associations. We must pay fuller attention to many hitherto unheard voices – the marginal farmer, the landless laborer, women, and other disadvantaged groups in the countryside. These are voices that governments and bureaucracies have thus far generally ignored.

These voices are now clamoring for our attention on a worldwide scale, and they are becoming a major force for transformation and value change. The roots of these yearnings can be traced in part to the liberation movements during and after World War II, and they have since been manifested in a number of ways: the civil rights movement here in the United States, the environment and peace movements, the women's movement, and the evolving workers' and peasants' associations in many parts of the world.

In seeking to position the power/morality equation within the framework of global transformation, therefore, we need to ponder not only how morality should be a checkrein on power, but also recognize the ethical necessity of granting power and legitimacy to these movements from below.

These expressions of desire for change, for having a vote in one's own future, are at the same time eroding the capacities of existing institutions and governments, for they are sharply questioning the existing order on which many of those governments are based. They pose a severe moral test to bureaucrats, planners, and others

who are wedded to the idea that efficiency and order – not noisy, unruly mass participation – should rule the day.

This is, of course, much the same dilemma with which the Founders of the American Republic wrestled two centuries ago, and the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 might be taken as indication of how severe a problem this was judged to be in the early years of the Republic. But the Third World countries today do not have the luxury of time and space that the United States had as it set out on its journey to nationhood. The man discontent with the prevailing order in eighteenth and nineteenth-century America could pick up his ax and his ideas and head farther into the virgin frontier to carve out a new life. There are no longer such frontiers for the poor, hungry, and despairing masses in the Third World.

It is thus all the more important that we listen to their voices and recognize that they may have something very, very significant to say. They represent, after all, the hopes of vast numbers of humankind for a more decent life and control of their own destinies. And we may find much that is fresh and original in their challenges to old assumptions about development and economic growth. We may, in fact, find today's new frontiers.

Here let me express my personal belief that, while we assuredly face a troublesome, turbulent, and disquieting march into the twenty-first century, the ultimate consequences of this journey are by no means totally bleak and despairing. Indeed, I believe that we may now be beginning to recognize that out of all the confusion, fragmentation, and disarray we may come to see development strategies and trajectories of industrialization that are basically different from those we have followed to date, and more consonant with the essential values inherent in our culture. We may be witnessing the unfolding here of a historical process that could lead to the emergence of alternative, non-Western, modern civilizations in various parts of the world – possibly the Sinitic, Hindu, and Islamic, as well as others. They are bound to take their rightful place side by side with Western civilization and could enrich and strengthen an interdependent, crowded, and fragile world.

This brings me once again to the underlying and compelling need I expressed at the outset: the moral imperative of our somehow arriving at an overarching set of shared human values beyond our particular parochialism to guide us during this perilous but also hopeful period of global transformation – when the strong, however grudgingly, see power slip from their grasp and the weak reach out for the promise of new power.

In the past, man was able to turn to religion and a sense of divine wisdom to help him set rules for living with his fellow man. As society diversified and expanded, religious influence waned, societies and systems grew more secular in character, and the rule of law came to be accepted as a way to regulate and order our lives.

But now we will have to develop the international legal infrastructure that will enable us to manage our globe peacefully, equitably, and effectively at a time when in many countries internal contradictions are eroding the moral consensus on which respect for law is based. The difficulties encountered in gaining acceptance and in securing implementation of the U.N. covenants on Human Rights, the plans of action adopted at the various U.N. global conferences, and now the difficulties with regard to the negotiations on the Law of the Sea demonstrate the wide differences that have to be bridged and the patience and persistence required.

In the end it is not only governments or experts that will shape these decisions. A great deal will also depend on the capacity for moral reasoning on the part of common people everywhere, which comes from the enlargement of our capacity to communicate with one another, to empathize with our fellow human beings, and to come to recognize ourselves in others. The achievement of this capacity will undoubtedly come most hard to those who are still strong. Reinhold Niebuhr warned us that "love for equals is difficult. We love what is weak and suffers. It appeals to our strength without challenging it." There are those who would challenge his view, contending that too often we despise the weak or turn our heads and pretend we don't see them. But the point I want to make is this, and I am now paraphrasing the late Barbara Ward: Unless

we learn to love our fellow human being – whatever his culture, color, ideology, relative strength, or social status – we may all very well perish.

We could perish because there is really so little space available for expansion in our lives, for maneuvering our hopes and aspirations without their clashing. Growing population densities, improved communication technology, and above all the means of violence now at our disposal have combined to make the only frontiers available those of communication and communion with our fellow human beings.

What it comes down to essentially is accepting the fact that the whole globe has become a very small island. This will mean learning what people living on small islands – or in conditions of extreme population density – learned long ago: that under such circumstances it is foolish to seek complete control over one's neighbor or total victory over one's adversary. In small, crowded places people's lives collide and rub and jostle against each other too much for a continuing state of conflict and tension to be bearable. Living on our small island Earth, with its growing billions, we will have to learn a great deal more about the art of tension management and the management of social harmony.

Our capacity for moral reasoning, however, is still badly eroded by the fragmentation of man's perception of himself and his ultimate value. To rediscover this moral and ethical capacity and to reassert it in ways that will speak to the real needs of a pluralistic world remains a daunting challenge. It is not that knowledge is lacking. Indeed, it is perhaps rather that too much of it presses in upon us and overwhelms us. Nor is intellectual ability in question. Instead, and again I turn to the wisdom of Hans Morgenthau, "the refusal to make morally relevant use of that intellectual ability is the real deficiency of scientific man."

Because of this refusal, the explosion of knowledge that has taken place has not necessarily added to our capacity to solve some of the pressing problems of our age.

My institution, the United Nations University, was established as a global institution to help expand and make more relevant the knowledge-base on which humankind will have to make its decisions about the future. It approaches this task with a pluralistic vision, recognizing that a consensus on global survival and advance into the twenty-first century will be achieved only after a thorough thrashing out of the viewpoints of many ideologies, cultures, and schools of thought.

This has put us in touch with scholars and scientists, philosophers and humanists, decision-makers and planners from many parts of the world and of many rival views. In the process of their coming together and discussing their honest differences – openly and often passionately – these men and women seem inevitably to come to realize how much they have in common on this finite planet.

What we have managed to set in train thus far is, of course, only a very tiny part of the immense worldwide effort that is needed to improve our understanding of the global transformation that is now occurring and of the many forces that drive and shape that transformation. But it is a start, and needless to say we welcome the support and participation of scholars and intellectuals like those gathered today to honor the memory of Hans Morgenthau and his vision of a just society.

Exchange With Soedjatmoko

QUESTION: Will there be a change of direction of the U.N. University under your tenure? Or will there be anything different you might do that the first rector did not?

SOEDJATMOKO: Very definitely. Like all new institutions, in the beginning it had to be small – limited within the available resources. As a result, the young university has concentrated on three major problem areas: world hunger, human and social development, and the use and management of natural resources. I am now building on what has been achieved, on the strengths that have developed in the process. I have asked the Council of the United Nations University for authority, and have received it, to broaden the range of problems with which the United Nations University should concern itself. This would include problems of peace, conflict resolution, and gloabal transformation. It includes problems of the global economy, including energy and resources. It will continue work in the areas of hunger, poverty, resources, and the environment as we have been doing. We will also continue to be concerned, I hope, with problems in the area of human and social development and the coexistence of peoples, cultures, and social systems. Finally, we should concern ourselves with the very fundamental questions faced by both the industrial and the developing world – the questions of science, technology, and their social and ethical implications.

These are the areas in which, gradually, we hope we will be able to move. And I believe we should make an effort to enlarge the outreach and the dissemination of knowledge which has also been entrusted to the United Nations University by its charter and try to develop a capacity to contribute to global learning.

QUESTION: Sir, I was delighted to hear you talk about love. It's very rare that in a colloquium like this you should willingly discuss such a concept in talking about transformation. I really would agree that being intellectually correct and even being morally right rarely results in transformation of itself. My question is, would you go a bit further. That is, if transformation is dependent upon, if you will, love, it has to occur in individual hearts to make any real difference. How do you go about leading us toward that?

SOEDJATMOKO: I will not try to answer your question in terms of my personal view. What is much more important is to realize that the processes that are leading to the awareness of this particular need are already going on in the world. We can see in the United States a process of the rediscovery of the sacred in human life. There is a process, if I may be bold enough to say so, of re-Christianization of the United States. It has not begun in Europe as yet; but I think it is not limited to the Moslem world, where one sees a resurgence of the search for a transcendental conception of life, but is taking place all over. The signs are weak, the signals are at variance. There are very ugly forms in which this search manifests itself. There are also very noble ones. And like human life in general, all this constitutes a disorderly process. We should, I believe, address the question of how we can begin to learn to live at a higher level of religious intensity while simultaneously growing in tolerance. In the past it used to be the religious institutions which taught children how to empathize and how to sympathize with people who are different from oneself or one's own group, providing they were of the same faith. It was the brotherhood of the faith that took people beyond their tribe, beyond their communities and their own nations.

The process of secularization in the world has led to the erosion of institutions of that kind. We don't have any institutions to replace them, and I think we should begin to think about the kind of institutions which would develop in our children the capacity to enlarge their range of empathy with people who are different from themselves – beyond the boundaries of a shared religion

toward a general sense of human solidarity. We must learn to empathize not only horizontally across the globe, but we must learn to develop empathy for the unborn generations of humankind. We must learn to extend ourselves over time, develop a sense of transgenerational solidarity. The necessity is imposed on us by the care we have to take of this little planet and its life-supporting systems. The growing enhancement of our capacity for empathy is really possible only by enlarging our sense of self – by transcending the narrow concept of self around which much of human life is centered, consciously or unconsciously. Love is one of the forces that enables a human being to do so – to dissolve the boundaries between individual human beings and become part of a whole that is larger and more meaningful than the pursuit of individual happiness. We have to move toward a different plateau on which we perceive the meaning of our lives in human community.

How that can be done is not a question that can be answered rationally. But if we observe what is happening now, we see that many people, especially among the young, are making choices about their security and the security of their country, about the energy mix by which they want to live, and about the culture they want to live in on a nonrational basis, on an intuitive basis. There seem to be processes going on way beyond the calculations of experts, that seem to be in many ways stupid, irrational – but, I believe, to be of tremendous significance for the preservation of the human species. One sign I see is that the reactions of people do not fit the preconceptions and calculations of experts, and I think that is very liberating and hopeful. I am not degrading the importance of knowledge and of science and technology. In fact, the problems we face cannot be resolved without science and technology. But the choices that will be made will include as an important element in this process what I sense to be instinctive reactions for the survival of the human species. We should realize that one of the problems we face resides in man's perception of himself.

In a sense secularization and the specialization in science have led to a fragmentation of man's perception of himself and of his

sense of ultimate meaning. Secularization and the specific dynamics with which science deals with the human perception of man has, in a sense, reduced and alienated the human being from the notion that he is essentially a moral being capable of and responsible for moral choice. I think we are moving – not in any particular way, but generally – into a situation where man once again is reasserting himself, his right and obligation to make such moral choices. The only thing we can do as we move and operate from different base lines culturally is to try to illuminate our choices and their implications, not only for ourselves but for those who are operating within different social and cultural contexts. It is only gradually that this capacity for broader human solidarity, for a larger range of human empathy, will grow.

QUESTION: Since you are a student to some degree of Hans Morgenthau's writings, I wonder if you see any evolution in those writings with respect to arms and organization. I remember very well in the late 1940s he and others like George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr were strong opponents of those utopians, those idealists, who would strengthen the United Nations and give it the basic role of keeping the peace. Yet some ten years ago Hans Morgenthau and others got terribly excited about the arms race and the terrible things that are going to happen if we don't do something about it. Do you see any basic change in his attitude toward the problem of peace with respect to the U.N.?

SOEDJATMOKO: Oh yes. I'm very much aware of this. As a young man I was intrigued and, in a way, fascinated by Hans Morgenthau's seemingly exclusive concern with power in and of itself. There was a point where I turned against these notions, and then once again I was attracted to him because I discovered his growing concern for international organization and for the necessity to link power to morality. I tend to admire people who are capable of growing and changing their minds more than those who show intellectual consistency *ad absurdum*. And so I would like to give testimony to both many of my initial doubts and my ultimate admiration for

his intellectual gifts to our societies.

QUESTION: I want to make a comment. There's a story about a monkey who escaped from the zoo. When they caught up with him, in one hand he had a copy of the Bible, in the other hand a copy of the Darwinist theory of evolution. When they asked him what he was doing, he said: "Well, I'm trying to figure out if I'm my brother's keeper or my keeper's brother!"

SOEDJATMOKO: Let me answer that by telling you an Indian myth. There is a story of an ascetic who had spent some ten years in a cave seeking the ultimate truth and meaning of life. Near death, he called a friend of his, a monkey, and said: "Before I die, I want to share with you the secret of ultimate truth and the meaning of life. But there is one condition attached to it: that is, you must not tell this to anyone. The penalty will be your eternal damnation in hell." And he whispered the secret into the ear of this monkey. The monkey then immediately climbed the roof of the hut and shouted the secret to all the world because he wanted everybody to share in salvation – even at the cost of his eternal damnation. That is another monkey speaking!

QUESTION: Because of the usual suspicion and actual conflict among nations, the nations of the world spend about $400 billion on armaments annually. Is not world peace an essential prerequisite for any kind of disarmament laboratory?

SOEDJATMOKO: It is. It is. In 1980 the world actually spent $500 billion for arms. The World Bank has recently published a study stating that in order to meet an expanded ten-year investment program for energy for oil-importing countries, $450-500 billion would be needed. It shows the absolute pathology of the arms race. The problem really, it seems to me, is the need to escape from mutual and escalating fears.

This is a psychological and technological problem of anticipating a technological breakthrough on the other side. Somewhere

that circle has to be broken. There is not much time. We seem to have moved from a postwar period to a prewar period. The war may not come, but the psychology is already there. And I think it is very important for us to realize the need to break the escalating cycle of fear and to have the courage to take risks for the sake of peace.

There is a limit, fortunately, to what people will accept. There is a point where people will say to their experts: "Go back to your calculators and your drawing boards and give us a different answer!" And that, I think, is a hopeful sign.

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