

Political Consequences of Global Inequality

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This text includes an outline and a set of references for the talk on December 9th, followed by the last paper written in the line of research of which this presentation is a part. I welcome comments. Please do not quote or cite without permission.

The general problem and the specific question

The relationship between statecraft (the consolidation of power over people and territory) and global patterns of inequality across lines of gender, class, ethnicity, race, and region.

Two years ago I presented a paper which attempted to understand the changing patterns of inequality since the global recession of the 1970s (the oil crisis). Thomas Schwartz (UCLA) responded, because of the political causes of the new inequality, there are likely to be no political consequences. The causes included political movements for economic and political liberalization.

I now think there are four or five types of political consequences. Here I want to:

Outline some of the evidence about changing patterns of inequality especially across regions of the world.

Joint problems: Global health issues.

Consequences of common coping strategies used by the least advantaged: Women's "empowerment."

Political consequences of the consolidation of wealth at the top of the global income hierarchy: Super-empowered individuals and the reform of global governance.

Political consequences of the greater separation of power and responsibility: Violence and structural violence in dependent societies.

Changing patterns of inequality

Income inequality across classes and regions has grown dramatically.

Gender inequality has decreased. Legal impediments to gender equality are disappearing. Wage gaps are diminishing. Access of women to traditionally male jobs is increasing. These trends are increasing the most rapidly in the regions of the world where the gaps between women and men were the greatest 25 years ago.

Formal political equality, liberal democracy, has increased dramatically.

Joint problems: Global health issues

Public health finding: unequal societies are unhealthy societies

Rise of infectious diseases, cholera, tuberculosis, AIDs in drug resistant forms, associated with attempts to cut the costs of public health services for the poor.

Don't test for disease; just give drugs, creating a population that incubates the drug-resistant form.

The drug-resistant form moves to the rich countries.

Distribution of causes of death in 2000 increasing looks like 1900.

Increasing international politics of disease management.

Are there other joint problems that have the same characteristics: environmental issues? peace and security?

Consequences of common coping strategies used by the least advantaged: Women's empowerment

Schwartz's argument assumes that there are no losers to growing inequality, but there are. The rich have been getting richer and the poor have been getting somewhat poorer. In eastern Europe there is the common 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 answer to questions about whether conditions of life have improved since the fall of communism. In South Africa, IDASA surveys put the economically disadvantaged closer to 60%.

We know that in the USA families have coped by gaining two incomes; there is a relationship between increased involvement of women in wage work and the forces limiting the incomes of those at the bottom of society.

This is true in Latin America, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, South Asia, Southwest Asia and North Africa (the Middle East), and Sub-Saharan Africa. It may not be true in Eastern Europe and China.

It means political "empowerment" even in China; women claiming a right to greater involvement in public decisions. Tim Evans's studies of Bangladesh.

The consolidation of wealth at the top of the global income hierarchy: Super-empowered individuals and the reform of global governance.

The UNDP says that a 4% tax on the world's 225 richest people would generate enough for basic education, healthcare, adequate food, safe water, and sanitation for all the world's people for a year. If we could reduce their recent 10% return on investment by about 40% and shift that to global welfare we would get these results.

Bill Gates can pay to immunize against childhood diseases. Ted Turner can pay to keep the UN going despite the opposition of the Republican leadership in Congress.

There are ethical considerations here, questions of opportunity costs: What happens if the privileged do not make these choices.

Practical consequences in terms of agenda setting for international institutions. The rich paid for cooperation before, in the late nineteenth century, and in the interwar years. The scale of current charity is almost ten-fold.

Violence and structural violence in dependent societies related to the separation of power and responsibility

I have tried to create an "index of control" to examine all the dimensions of inequality. Imagine a woman in Africa, say, Ghana:

Her control has increased due to democratization, but the government is not just beholden to its citizens; it is also beholden to foreign donors. In some cases up to 75% of government income.

Along with democratization has come marketization, so the index should reflect the fact that the market power of the wealthy within the Ghanaian economy has greater impact than before, and that an average woman's wages are higher.

Along with democratization and marketization has come globalization, so that those with market power in the world economy have gained relative influence.

In many parts of the world, more power has shifted to those with the greatest market power in the world economy rather than to the democratically empowered and market-empowered wage-earning woman.

There is less match of power and responsibility, which really is the definition of structural violence.

You can have consequences of things not done, e.g., international aid agencies both public and private failing to recognize and report the early warning indicators of the Rwandan government's genocidal intent.

You have consequences of things done, e.g., if Shaw and others are correct, the impact of IFI policies on the rise of protracted social conflicts in Africa and elsewhere.

It is hard to match responsibility and power.

Further Reading

Growing global inequality may not have political consequences:

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Ordeshook, Peter C. and Thomas Schwartz, "A Constitution for the Russian Federation", IRIS Working Paper No. 51," IRIS Working Paper No. 51, June 1993.

Changes in global patterns of inequality over the last 25 years:

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Joint Problems: New global health issues

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**Consequences of common coping strategies used by the least-advantaged:
Gender “empowerment.”**

Murphy, Craig N. ed. *Egalitarian Politics in an Age of Globalization*. New York: St Martins, forthcoming 2000.

Razavi, Shahra, Gendered Poverty and Social Change, Geneva, UNRISD Discussion Paper 94, 1998.

Super-empowered individuals and the reform of global governance

Braithwaite, John and Peter Drahos, *Global Business Regulation*, unpublished book manuscript, 1999.

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Velasco e Cruz, Sebastiao C. Another Regard: On the Gramscian Approach to International Organization, Department of Political Science, University of Campinas, 1999.

**Violence and structural violence in dependent societies related to the
separation of power and responsibility**

Dunn, Kevin C. and Timothy M. Shaw, eds, *Africa’s Challenge to IR Theory*. New York, St Martins, forthcoming 2000.

Murphy, Craig N. and Thomas G. Weiss, International Peace and Security at a Multilateral Moment: What We Seem to Know, What We Don’t, and Why, *Contemporary Security Policy*, forthcoming 1999.

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Egalitarian Social Movements and New World Orders

Here is a puzzle: Over the past quarter-century, in most of the world, liberal democracy has flourished and the status of women has improved. The percentage of us who live within liberal democracies has doubled since 1975. Gaps between men and women on a whole host of measures including income and access to jobs have decreased in almost all countries, and they have decreased the most rapidly in the places where once they were the greatest. Yet, during the same period income inequality among occupational classes and among different regions of the world has increased more rapidly than in any period about which we have reliable knowledge. Today, much more than ever before, "The rich get both richer and fewer." The North the most privileged classes in all societies have gotten relatively wealthier while the incomes of the South and those of the least-privileged social classes have stayed the same.¹

What accounts for the difference? Is it, at least in part, a matter of politics? Throughout the whole period there have been social movements pushing for political equity, for gender equity, for greater economic equality within societies, and for the rapid development of poorer societies. Why has one set of movements been more successful? Is it because the political opportunities open to democracy movements and to gender-equity movements have been greater? Is it because they have developed cleverer strategies to exploit those few opportunities that have been available? Is some combination of political opportunity and effective strategy involved? If so, why have differing political opportunities been available? And why have different social movements arrived at different strategies to exploit them?

One clue to this contemporary puzzle may be found in the recurrent roles that egalitarian social movements have played in each of the *globalizing transitions*

¹The quotation is from Lant Pritchett (1995) Divergence, Big Time, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1522 (Background paper for *World Development Report 1995*), pp. 12-13, which is also an excellent source of evidence on the increasing gaps between the North and the South. *World Development Report 1995*, which focuses on labor, provides some of the best evidence of growing inequality across occupational classes. On the expansion of democratic governance see Michael D. Ward, John O'Loughlin, Jordin S. Cohen, Kristian S. Gleditsch, David S. Brown, David A. Reilly, Corey L. Lofdahl, and Michael E. Shin (1999) The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, forthcoming. On gender inequality, U.N. Development Programme (1995) *Human Development Report*. On some of the relatively inadequate explanations for the overall patterns that have been offered by liberal economists see Craig N. Murphy (1999a) Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy: Global Political-Economic Visions at the End of the Century, *New Political Economy*, forthcoming.

between industrial eras that have taken place since the Industrial Revolution. This paper proposes two hypotheses:

1. Egalitarian social movements have played a role in the emergence of each new industrial era by advancing and promoting the resocialization of some of the social relations that had been marketized in the later phases of the waning industrial era. In doing so, the movements have helped powerful social forces temporarily resolve conflicts that are inherent to industrial capitalism. That conflict resolution, in turn, has encouraged the kinds of investment that are essential to the emergence of the new industrial era. Arguably, women's movements and democracy movements have played that role in the current transition from "the Automobile Age" to "the Information Age."
2. The political opportunities available to social movements during those periods that are conducive to some resocialization have been influenced by the nature of the conflicts in the later stages of the waning industrial era. Egalitarian movements involved at the center of conflicts in the waning industrial era rarely contribute to the resocialization that marks the beginning of the new industrial era. Thus, for example, the relative failure of third world movements and of international labor movements in the 1980s and 1990s can be linked to their centrality to the conflicts of the 1970s.

To illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses this paper begins by outlining the larger evolutionary perspective on industrial history of which they are a part. Then I consider the differing roles that egalitarian movements play in what I call the *clash* phase as distinct from the *build* phase of each industrial era. I argue that the politics of one *clash* phase effects the political opportunities in the next *build* phase and the current period in light of this argument. The final section contrasts the perspective on egalitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) with those of other scholars who have done extensive empirical work on the phenomena.

The lessons of leading industrial economies

This paper is part of a larger project aimed at understand the relationship between persistent patterns of human *inequality* and the issues at the center of International Relations (IR): *statecraft*, or the consolidation of power across people and territory, and formalized relations between fundamentally different societies. The project follows from my 1994 book, *International Organization and*

Industrial Change.² Industrialization has been the proximate cause of some the greatest inequalities that we know.³ Not surprisingly then, the promotion of various forms of international organization has often been conceived by liberals and socialists as an essentially egalitarian form of statecraft especially relevant to the industrial age. Of course, the actual impact of international institutions on human equality has not been as straightforward.

In the larger project I use the experience of egalitarian social movements, especially their many failed strategies, to help understand the connection between international relations and inequality. While the failed strategies of the disadvantaged may be of little interest to many students of IR, this paper begins with a topic of wider disciplinary interest: The successful political and economic strategies of the leading industrial economies. These are the economic models that Volker Bornscheier argues have placed "substantial adaptive pressure upon other societal models," meaning that other societies have been, "forced to incorporate the [model's] economically and politically superior institutions if they did not want to risk being outdone by the competition for core position."⁴

At least since the Industrial Revolution one key to successful great-power statecraft has been an economy that regularly generates new *lead industries*, sectors that are disproportionately responsible for economic growth.⁵ Thus, Great Britain's ability to generate cotton mills of the Industrial Revolution and the rail and steel industries of the Railway Age was central to its powers throughout the nineteenth century. The ability of Germany and the United States to catch up to Britain in the Railway Age, to generate the new electrical, chemical, and packaged consumer products industries of the turn-of-the-century Second Industrial Revolution, and to generate the mid-twentieth century

² Craig N. Murphy (1994) *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (Cambridge and New York: Polity Press and Oxford University Press). An abridgment that includes the book's central argument appears in Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (1999) *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon), pp. 383-96.

³ The differences between industrialized and less-industrialized regions of the world. See Paul Bairoch (1993) Was there a Large Income Differential before Modern Development?, in *Economic and World History: Myths and Paradoxes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 101-10.

⁴ Volker Bornschier (1995) West European Unification and the Future Structure of the Core, in Christopher K. Chase-Dunn and Volker Bornschier, eds. *The Future of Hegemonic Rivalry*. Department of Sociology, The Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore, Md., February.

⁵ George Modelski and William R. Thompson (1995) *Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press) demonstrate that the connection between the ability to generate lead sectors and successful leadership can be traced back much further within the Western civilization area and perhaps even across Eurasia.

industries of the Automobile Age let them both challenge Britain, and let the US eventually surpass Britain, as the global power.

Even outside the realm of great-power rivalry participation in the generation of new global lead industries has been central to the continuing power of those states that have entered the industrial *core* of the world economy. Finland, Spain, and South Korea all have generated parts of the new information-technology based industries of the emerging Information Age, something that distinguishes them from Russia and other major powers of the semi-periphery.

<u>Industrial era</u>	<u>lead industries</u>	<u>capitalist industrial powers</u>	<u>other industrialized core regions</u>
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION Circa 1780-1835	cotton mills	Great Britain	
RAILWAY AGE Circa 1835-1890	railways steel	Great Britain	German Customs Union, United States, Benelux Countries, France
2ND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION circa 1890-1945	chemicals electrical goods branded consumer products	British Empire German Empire United States	Benelux, Nordic, and Anglo-Pacific Rim (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) Countries, France, Italy
AUTOMOBILE AGE Circa 1945-2000	automobiles aircraft electronics	United States	EC and EFTA, Anglo-Pacific Rim, Japan
INFORMATION AGE Circa 2000-	computers telecommunications equipment and services software biotechnology	United States European Union Japan	Anglo-Pacific Rim, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong

Table 1: Characteristics of Industrial Eras

Since Adam Smith liberals in the classical tradition have had at least a partial explanation for the relative success of the capitalist industrial powers and other core states in generating new lead industries. The core countries have all had

republican governments. In Smithian terms, that means that political power has never been monopolized by one of the three fundamental classes: capitalists, agricultural landlords, or laborers. In particular Smithian liberals fear giving capitalists complete control over the state. Capitalist interests assure that they would use their control of the state to create monopolies against the commonweal. This point, Smith argued, was proven by the experience of the colonial companies that controlled the state in India and North America. In contrast, the immediate interests of both the landed aristocracy and the working class were the same as those of society at large; both classes desired continuous improvements in the material wealth of the nation. Under republican constitutions (divided government) aristocratic and/or working-class interests in the commonweal would balance the economically dynamic, but asocial, interests of the capitalist class. This would leave a state in which capitalist competition would assure ever-greater productivity (via the increasing division of labor) and aristocratic and/or working class power would assure capitalist competition.⁶

There are many flaws in this line of argument. It overlooks the world-systemic factors that have made it difficult for republican governments to survive in poor and exploited societies.⁷ It certainly also must overlook some other factors that would explain why the long-lived republican constitutions of India or Costa Rica have so far failed to let them enter the core. More troubling is the fundamentalist faith in economic *laissez faire* despite the evidence that the states which have entered the core after Great Britain -- from the US and Germany in the 1800s to the largest of the Asian tigers today -- have all initially nurtured competitive industries in relatively closed national markets.⁸ The argument also ignores the

⁶ Adam Smith (1776/1981) *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 265-6, 630-4. Murphy (1994), pp. 14-16.

⁷Core powers remain relatively willing to undermine democracies in weaker states in which democratic governments challenge powerful core economic interests and international financial institutions (IFIs) that are maintained by core liberal democracies to assure the stability of international financial markets have been willing to undermine third world democracies if doing so seems essential to achieving the IFIs' central goals. Moreover, stable democracies have tended to arise as consequence of the power of labor and/or mass-based nationalist movements in capitalist societies that do not have an entrenched sector of coerced agricultural labor. Many power countries have such a sector and many have no powerful labor movement. See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens (1992) *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Finally, relatively inegalitarian societies -- typical of much of the third world -- also breed protracted social conflicts which tend to undermine liberal democracy.

⁸ J. Ann Tickner's (1987) *Self-Reliance versus Power Politics: The American and Indian Experience in Building Nation States* (New York: Columbia University Press) illuminates the strategic issues that are often overlooked in purely economic explanations of why successful industrializing powers rely on illiberal strategies in order to catch up with older industrial states. The current version of the economic logic behind this phenomena -- an update of the "infant industry" arguments of Hamilton and List, can be found in the so-called "new international

weak or nonexistent republicanism of some governments throughout the period in which they first made successful bids to enter the core (e.g., Imperial Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea). Republican governments and openness to international competition may be needed to assure that a society can contribute to the *new* lead industries of the next industrial era. Yet republican governments may not be essential, and complete international openness may be detrimental, to the task of catching up with the lead industries of the day.

Nonetheless, there is a rational core to the Smithian argument connecting limitations on the ability of capitalists to control of the state to the social conditions that are conducive to the emergence of a new set of lead industries. In order to specify that significant kernel it is useful to consider two sets of problems inherent to industrial capitalism that must be overcome for new industrial eras to arise: 1) the political problem of *globalization*, and, 2) the current manifestations of the social *conflicts* inherent to industrial societies.

The problem of globalization

By *globalization* I mean here simply the tendency for successful industrial economies to outgrow their political boundaries. In Smithian terms a successful economy is one in which there is an ever-increasing division of labor. This is inherently limited by "the extent of the market." Market growth -- not growth in the amount of money that is following through the market, but growth in the number of workers (or even more precisely the labor power) united within a single market -- is a long-term requirement of a successful economy. Smith's insight ultimately is not one about markets, per se, it is one about the *technical* "division of labor;" as Karl Polanyi recognized: To have continuous economic growth requires constantly increasing the number of people across whom the "division of labor" takes place.⁹

When Marx and Engels translate the same insight into their own terms Smith's intuition becomes the basis for the Marxian image of the bourgeoisie progressively turning the entire world into a single productive machine.¹⁰ Marx's key idea, Kees van der Pijl writes, is that of the incremental, ultimately global, *socialization* of labor via the inherently asocial processes of the market.¹¹

economics," Paul R. Krugman, ed (1986) *Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics* (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press).

⁹Karl Polanyi (1957) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times* (Boston: Beacon Press), p. 49.

¹⁰ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (1932/1848) *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: International Publishers), pp. 13-14.

¹¹ Kees van der Pijl (1998) *Transnational Classes and International Relations* (New York, Routledge).

Capitalists need markets to expand beyond the social and political boundaries that once contained them and despite the support that any current set of bounded political entities might have given to industrial capitalism in the past.

Globalization, understood in this sense, has never been smooth or continuous. It has occurred in a step-wise fashion in response to political changes, resulting in the periodic development of new, larger social orders. Political coalitions among capitalists are needed to support such "new orders" since no individual capitalist industrial or financial sector reflects the general interest of capital *per se* and there are always more- or less-powerful sectors that benefit from the current, less-than-global, social order. Similarly, at any time there will be more- or less powerful socially protected non-capitalist forces that will oppose the next phase of globalization.

The large steps in the step-wise process of globalization have occurred in conjunction with the periodic changes in lead industries. The beginning of each new era is initiated, in part, by large investments, which, in turn, have typically required market areas larger than those that typified the lead industries of the waning industrial era. The Industrial Revolution involved large, often public investments in the power systems for mills. The Railway Age involved the large investments in railway networks. The Second Industrial Revolution required network investments in electrical power systems and phone systems. The waning Automobile Age involved even larger investments in roads, modern railway networks, airports, the modern mega-factories, and the marketing and research facilities typical of twentieth-century industry. The Information Age has required the even larger investments in the Internet and in the computerized design and factory systems, such as for the Boeing 777.¹² As has been the case with the Internet (and as was the case with American railroads) these bulky investments sometimes can be made piecemeal. Nonetheless, since the Industrial Revolution, those network-building investments at the beginning of an industrial era always have taken place over a larger geographic scale than the network investments of the previous era. Other large investments, such as those needed to build power plants or to fund the costly research operations of a modern chemical firm require a large market prior to the investment. This assures investors that enough of the product or service can be sold so that that the investors can be confident that their investment will be paid back.¹³

¹²This perspective on the connection between large or "bulky" investments and the beginnings of new industrial eras is consistent with Systems Dynamics arguments about the long wave [John D. Sterman and Erik Mosekilde (1994) *Business Cycles and Long Waves: A Behavioral Disequilibrium Perspective*, in Willi Semmler, ed. *Business Cycles: Theory and Empirical Methods*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers] as well as with the views of Modelski and Thompson (1995).

¹³Murphy (1994), pp. 123-7, 229-31, 234.

In theory, the problem raised by the pressures toward globalization could be solved by means other than the geographic expansion of the fundamental political/economic units of industrial society. The size of the community over which the division of labor takes place could be achieved by natural growth in population, imperialism, or the progressive integration of industrial societies, but, in fact, integration has been an essential solution. Human populations cannot grow as rapidly as "potential productivity" -- i.e., human invention of new ways to do things with seemingly less labor input -- will allow economies to grow and imperialism is a relatively costly endeavor. To assure industrial growth via imperialism in less-industrialized societies (the British strategy of the late nineteenth century and the strategy of Italy and France in the first half of the twentieth-century) adds the cost of political control to the cost of the investments in infrastructure and human capital needed to make the strategy successful. To assure industrial growth via imperial control of other core societies (the Nazi strategy in Europe) requires fighting other industrial powers, powers that may be able to defeat you.

The figure below illustrates this perspective on globalization by highlighting the growth and integration of the market areas of lead industries since the Industrial Revolution.




Figure 1: "Globalization": Market Areas of Lead Industries, 1800-

The problem of conflict

Despite the fact that integration rather than imperialism is the characteristic mode of "globalization," the process does not occur without conflict. Students of International Relations immediately recognize that many of the blank spaces in the figure above cover periods of great conflict: the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, the World Wars. In *International Organization and Industrial Change* and in subsequent papers on the histories of four core regions (the United Kingdom, Germany, the Northeastern United States, and Japan)¹⁴ I argue that

¹⁴Murphy (1994), pp. 18-23, (1998a) *Globalization and Governance: A Historical Perspective*, in Roland Axtmann, ed., *Globalization in Europe*, London: Pinter Publishers and (1995) *Globalization and Governance: 'Passive Revolution' and the Earlier Transitions to Larger Scale Industrial Economies in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Northeastern United States,*

even successful industrial societies have had to deal with four types of fundamental social conflicts that are either inherent to industrial society or else inherent to the less-than-global stages of globalization that we have experienced so far. These are conflicts between those who benefit most from the emergence of new industrial eras and

1. Industrial **labor**, ultimately over democratic control of production,
2. all of those who have received political-economic advantage from their special connection to **older sectors** (i.e., agriculture and older lead sectors)
3. citizens and local rulers of "**the third world**," i.e., those regions within the market area that will not experience all the benefits of the new lead industries, regions whose economic roles will be limited to providing low-wage labor and resources (natural and agricultural) for the industrial core
4. **rival industrial centers** (other core powers within the same system) or **other industrial systems** especially those based on alternative forms of industrialism or proto-industrialism, i.e., the Southern slave system, German and Italian fascism, or Soviet socialism in contrast to what van der Pijl calls the "Lockean" systems of the industrial powers that have so far been the most successful.

While managing these four types of conflict is the central, fundamental new task of modern statecraft, the fundamental conflicts of pre-industrial civilizations remain:

1. conflicts between humanity and the rest of the living world that are rooted in our incomplete transition to a settled form of life,
2. conflicts over gender inequality that are rooted in the gendered origin of the state,
3. conflicts between "inner" and "outer" ethnic groups that are rooted in the characteristic response of settled societies to their vulnerability to raiding/warrior societies.¹⁵

and Northeastern Japan, Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September.

¹⁵Arguments for the ubiquity of these conflicts are made in, Murphy (1999b) Gender Inequality and the Realpolitik of Agricultural Civilizations. Prepared for the Annual Meeting of International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February. I have been warned by some of

The intensity of all of these conflicts changes over time and is linked to the regular pattern of transition from one industrial era to the next in what can be summarized as a *build, thrive, clash-grab-hoard cycle*.¹⁶ The *build* phase is characterized by the temporary resolution of most of the conflicts. Scholars who base their analysis on the insights of Antonio Gramsci write about the formation of a new *historical bloc*, reflected in a mix of governance strategies of firms, states, international institutions, and popular social forces. The social calm thus established encourages and is reciprocally encouraged by relatively large fixed investments that fuel the take-off of new leading industries. These lead to a period of relative prosperity (*thrive*), also characterized by the mitigation of the social conflicts inherent to capitalist industrialism. This period, along with the build phase, may be characterized by a Gramscian form of hegemony.

The last years of this period is apt to be marked by a kind of high cosmopolitanism, a widespread willingness of governments to risk resources in new liberal internationalist projects. This is the phase in which the first of the new market-expanding international institutions that become relevant to the *next* phase of industrial growth are established. The International Telegraph Union of 1865 helped create the infrastructure of the extended national markets of Second Industrial Revolution take-off in the 1890s. The Radiotelegraph Union of 1906 helped link the intercontinental markets of the Automobile and Jet Age. Intelsat, established in 1965, provides of the key infrastructure for today's Information Age¹⁷

However, almost simultaneously with this high cosmopolitanism, some of the inherent conflicts re-emerge: conflicts with labor, conflicts with those on the periphery of the privileged capitalist core, conflicts between different industrial centers of the core, especially conflicts with other social models governing parts of the world economy. These *clashes* mark the beginning of a long period of reduced prosperity, the next phase of which begins with the reassertion of capitalist power in a profit-*grabbing* mode that may include cost-cutting globalization. As Henk Overbeek argues, this period is one in which productive capital is in crisis and the "concept of money capital," liberal fundamentalism, "'presents itself' as the obvious, rational solution."¹⁸ Governments adopt cost-

those who have heard me present those arguments that they are unnecessary to the case made here, which requires only evidence that conflicts of these three types *have* existed over the time period in question. Obviously, I believe an even stronger statement can be made.

¹⁶See Murphy (1994), pp. 26-45, 261. This formula could be thought of as providing one way to summarize stages of the economic long wave.

¹⁷Murphy (1994), p. 6.

¹⁸Henk Overbeek, (1990) *Global Capitalism and National Decline: The Thatcher Decade in Perspective* (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 28.

cutting policies and begin to focus on issues of international competitiveness, and the institutions responsible for the stability of the international financial system begin to impose liberal fundamentalist policies on states that are increasingly desperate for such international or transnational support. The scholars who borrow from Gramsci argue that while this phase of reassertion by capital, especially by financial capital, may be marked by significant economic activity, much of it is apt to be speculative, and of little lasting importance. Moreover, when speculative bubbles burst, the habit of under-investment in production is apt to continue, leading to the stagnation of the *hoard* phase of even more defensive strategies and greater political parochialism — the phase that many Gramscians, like many world-systems and long-wave analysts, fear the world economy has now entered.

In slightly different ways Robert W. Cox, Kees van der Pijl and I have described the transitions that take place at this point as involving the second half of what Polanyi called the *double movement* against the extreme market logic of the liberal fundamentalism that becomes so predominant in the grab phase.¹⁹ That movement involves the intellectual leadership of "experts in government" or the *cadre class*, men and women that have often been *critical* liberals who partially accept the liberal logic, but who also see a larger roles for government. Van der Pijl sees them, in the twentieth century, as most-typically found among the core supporters and officials of social democratic parties. These intellectual leaders have marshaled both political leaders and industrial leaders (most often, of the new potential leading sectors) in what Gramsci called *passive revolutions*, comprehensive reformist projects that, nonetheless, require no 'fundamental reordering of social relations'.²⁰

One of the most distinctive aspects of the Gramscian accounts of both nineteenth and twentieth century transitions has been the argument that these passive revolutions have been supported by international institutions, something that makes sense when one considers the need for international integration suggested by the forces behind globalization. Transnational and intergovernmental bodies have not just played a role in the internationalization of the economically coercive aspects of state power (i.e., the role of international financial institutions

¹⁹Robert W. Cox (1992) 992. The United Nations, Globalization, and Democracy. The 1992 John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture. Providence, R.I.: The Academic Council on the United Nations System. Kees van der Pijl (1990) Socialisation and Social Democracy in the State System, in W. Koole, M. Krätke, H. Overbeek, R. Schildmeijer, and K. van der Pijl, eds. *After the Crisis: Political Regulation and the Capitalist Crisis*. Department of International Relations. University of Amsterdam, March.

²⁰"The 'dialectic of conservation and innovation' which constitutes passive revolution "is called 'reformism' in modern terminology." David Forgacs, ed (1988) *An Antonio Gramsci Reader*. (New York: Schocken Books,)p. 428.

at the beginning of each transition). In the *build* part of the cycle international institutions have promoted new, less-defensive strategies for both firms and states, the kind of strategies that can contribute to an effective governance mix.

An earlier attempt to confirm this account of the role of conflicts in transitions

HYPOTHESIS	Cases Supporting	Cases Challenging	Ambiguous Cases
1. High cosmopolitan government strategies typify end of preceding era of high growth.	13	2	1
2. Clashes with popular classes, groups on the periphery, or other economic centers mark the beginning of the period of slower growth.	16	0	0
3. Privileged economic groups respond with defensive moves, profit grabbing at home and abroad.	13	0	3
4. Governments become more concerned with competitiveness.	10	1	5
5. International or transnational institutions becoming increasingly concerned with imposing market logic.	13	0	1
6. Speculative bubble bursts, followed by more parochial strategies.	7	0	5
7.0 Reformist politics, passive revolution, marks the beginning of the new industrial era.	9	0	3
7.1 New government strategy comes from critical liberals of the cadre class.	5	2	5
7.2 New government strategy triggered by fears about the globalizing strategies of the popular classes at home or abroad.	12	0	0
7.3 New government strategy involves actions against excesses of the market	11	1	0
8. New government strategy encourages firms to invest in equity enhancing systems of production,	9	1	2
9. Intergovernmental institutions play key role in encouraging the reformist strategies of governments.	9	3	0

Table 2: Testing the Account of Transitions between Industrial Eras

between industrial eras suggests that it does successfully capture key elements of the political and economic history of Bornschier's regions that have exerted "substantial adaptive pressure " ²¹ Table 2 summarizes these results. This is relatively strong confirmation, with some exceptions such as hypothesis 7.1: "New government strategy comes from critical liberals of the cadre class." The next section proposes a slightly different version of this crucial element in this evolutionary account, linking innovation to the action of egalitarian social movements.

Before turning to that section, let me summarize the argument so far: There have been a series of stepwise changes in the scale of industrial economies from the regional/national economies of the early Industrial Revolution to the intercontinental markets that linked the OECD countries and the third world in the Automobile Age. Each transition to a more encompassing industrial order has initially been marked by a period of relatively slow economic growth in which rapid marketization takes place, the state seems to retreat, and uncompromising versions of *laissez-faire* liberalism triumph. Up to now a second phase has always followed, marked by the increasing role of a more socially-oriented liberalism, the rise of which has been linked to the growing success of egalitarian social movements. This second phase, or, in Polanyi's terms, the second part of this "double movement," has also been associated with the consolidation of the whole range of governance institutions -- from the inter-state level down to the shop floor. Those institutions, for a time, help maintain a period of relative peace and relative prosperity over a larger industrial market area in which a new generation of lead industries becomes dominant. In time, however, various social conflicts, including those that arise from the restraints on liberal innovation imposed by each era's governance institutions, lead to crises, to which *laissez-faire* liberals provide the initial, successful social response. The two-stage pattern is consistent with core arguments of the liberal internationalist tradition that goes back to Adam Smith who expected that any putatively republican state that was captured by the interests of profit-takers would not be able to sustain a liberal, highly-productive economy. Instead, an economy based on cartels, monopolization, etc. would take hold -- as it had in company-run colonies of Smith's day.

²¹Murphy (1995). The 16 cases for hypotheses one through five are the transitions to the Industrial Revolution in the U.K. (1), the transitions to the Railway age in the U.K., Germany, and the Northeast U.S. (3) and the transitions to the Second Industrial Revolution, Automobile Age, and Information Age in those three regions and in Northeast Japan (3x4=12) [1+3+12=16]. The 12 cases for hypotheses six onward exclude the transitions to the Information Age.

Egalitarian Social Movements in the Clash and Build Phases

An economy based on cartels and monopolization caused by the capture of the state by capitalist forces is also the way Susan Strange characterized the world economy in the 1980s and early 1990s.²² Within the logic of Smith's or Strange's arguments we can imagine powerful egalitarian social movements playing a role in the restoration of the "divided government" -- the *substantively* liberal, republican polities -- that allows a liberal economy to be a source of prosperity, human dignity, and peace. The recent decades of relatively slow economic growth, rapid marketization, and the relative retreat of the state may be a stage in the development of a wider liberal world order. If the earlier pattern holds, the prospects for the next phase may be linked to the relative success of the whole range of egalitarian social movements.

Egalitarian movements from periods of prosperity to periods of conflict

When one thinks of the historical links between egalitarian social movements and industrial cycles what immediately comes to mind is not this hypothesized link to the construction of new industrial orders, but the clear connection between egalitarian politics and the social conflicts that mark periods of relatively slow economic growth. Labor movements, anti-colonial movements, development movements, women's movements, movements for ethnic and racial equality, and more comprehensive movements for democracy and human rights all serve to identify and articulate the fundamental conflicts that emerge within industrial societies.

Much of the most persuasive literature on social movements has emphasized the modernity of social movements, their "modular" (replicable and replicated) character, and the way in which they are facilitated and limited by the political opportunities created by modern nation-states.²³ Nonetheless, these findings should not serve to obscure the connection between economic and social conditions and the likelihood that egalitarian movements will form and act. Eighteenth-century settlers in Britain's American colonies organized their anti-colonial republican movement in response to the increasingly harsh direct rule

²²Susan Strange (1996) *The Retreat of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

²³Most significantly, Sidney Tarrow (1998) *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Second edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). For a review of the well-developed *theoretical* work in comparative politics and a discussion of the underdevelopment of empirical theory on transnational social movements see Joel Krieger and Craig N. Murphy (1998) *Transnational Opportunity Structures and the Evolving Roles of Movements for Women, Human Rights, Labor, Development, and the Environment: A Proposal for Research*. Department of Political Science, Wellesley College.

necessitated by the long (if successful) British hegemonic conflict with France as well as to the political opening created by an increasingly distracted imperial power. The British Chartist and factory hours movements responded both to the harshness of the labor regime in the early mills as well as to the political opportunities created by proximity and by the opportunity for alliances with embattled Tory interests. Turn-of-the-century labor and anti-colonial movements tried to expand the limits of the possible in an era when unprecedented prosperity and relative peace promised a more fundamentally democratic future. Similar economic and social conditions influenced the civil rights movements, development movements, and new social movements of the 1950s and 1960s.

Standard arguments about the intensity of domestic conflict should lead us to expect that egalitarian social movements will become active during periods of relative peace and prosperity. We should also expect that they will become intensely contentious if the high expectations that they have during those "good times" are frustrated by more powerful social forces bent on maintaining the inegalitarian status-quo. My earlier study of Britain, the U.S., Germany, and Japan revealed the role of specific egalitarian movements in the early "clashes" that marked the ends of periods of relative prosperity.²⁴

²⁴Murphy (1995).

Clash Period	Egalitarian Movements Involved
Pre-Industrial Revolution Britain	settler colonists, poor people's
Pre-Railway Age Britain	democracy, labor
Pre-Railway Age United States	labor
Pre-Railway Age Germany	democracy
Pre-Second Industrial Revolution Britain	anti-colonial, labor
Pre-Second Industrial Revolution United States	anti-slavery (Civil War)
Pre-Automobile Age Britain	labor, anti-colonial
Pre-Automobile Age United States	labor
Pre-Automobile Age Germany	labor
Pre-Information Age Britain	labor, civil rights
Pre-Information Age United States	third world, labor

Table 3: Egalitarian Social Movements and Conflicts Marking the End of Periods of Growth

Egalitarian movements from periods of conflict to periods of prosperity

Consider a more inclusive level of analysis, i.e., not at nation-states or sub-national units but at the level of the geographic units in which the leading industries of industrial economies have developed (as outlined in Figure 1). At this level of analysis the dominant conflicts of each clash period have often been between alternative economic centers and alternative social orders. These include the conflict between industrial North and slave south in the United States, the series of brief wars between Prussia and Denmark, Austria, and France that helped unify the German Empire while securing its specific geographic class structure, and the World Wars that bracketed thirty years of this century. It is commonplace, and relatively accurate, to conclude that the political-economic models of the social forces that lost these "international"

conflicts bridging the periods between industrial eras played no role in the historical blocs (the combination of ruling social forces, ideas, and institutions) that defined the new industrial era. The social model of the American slave Confederacy played little part in the social order of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era United States and its new empire in the Caribbean and Central American "near abroad" and in the Pacific. The Austro-Hungarian vision of Germany and Napoleon III's vision of Europe played little role in the new Prussian German Empire or in the European Inter-Imperial System that provided German firms with the market area needed to be part of the Second Industrial Revolution. The Fascist vision of Eurasia and Africa and the idea of an Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere played little role in the "Free World" order established under U.S. hegemony after the Second World War.

The hypothesis I want to advance is that something similar may be the case when the dominant conflict preceding an industrial era is "domestic," or, at least one contained within the older economic unit. The social forces that "lose" play little role in the next world order. For example, when Chartists and early industrial labor movements challenged the early nineteenth-century social orders of Britain and New England, that may have helped assure that the Railway Age would, in both regions, remain a period of little concrete improvement for wage workers. When the Indian revolutionaries of 1857 failed, they nonetheless raised the perceived long-term costs of maintaining the economically crucial empire, and that may have contributed to Britain's commitment to an increasingly coercive imperialism throughout the rest of the century. When Vietnamese Communists, OPEC oil barons, and other elements of the diverse third world reaction to American hegemony contributed mightily to the end of the post-World War II "Golden Years," but failed to create a New International Economic Order, they may have helped assure that the Information Age would be particularly harsh on the societies condemned to be providers of resources, low-wage products, and cheap labor.

These are, indeed, just hypotheses. To confirm them would require detailed historical analyses of the "build" phase of each of the industrial eras. However, earlier research on the North-South politics of the 1970s onward suggests that a plausible case can be made about the most recent period.²⁵

²⁵Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy (1988) *America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis* (London: Pinter Publishers); (1993) International Institutions, Decolonization, and Development, *International Political Science Review*, 14(1): 71-86; (1995) La nuova teoria della pace delle Nazioni unite, in Gian Giacomo Migone and Olga Re, eds, *A cinquant'anni dalla nascita delle Nazioni unite*, a special issue of *Europa/Europe* 4(4): 97-121.

Some may find these hypotheses neither particularly interesting nor surprising. Why should we find it remarkable that social movements of those who suffer from persistent structures of inequality play no role in the development of new social orders? It is only surprising when we recognize that *some* movements of that sort have played such role as part of the double movements that have marked the transitions from one industrial era to the next.²⁶ For the most part, the relevant movements have been "domestic," labor and progressive parties, suffragists, anti-slavery movements in the U.S. and Britain, and anti-colonial movements within empires. Yet, there has long been a transnational character to many of the most successful egalitarian movements. The anti-slavery movement in the U.S. originated in transnational (often Quaker or Jacobin, i.e., French-Revolution-inspired) associations, was fostered and transformed by world associations of the African Diaspora who opposed the Anglo-American "progressive" solution of resettling all black slaves in Africa, and helped nurture and maintain the social movements that fought for the end to slavery in Latin America.²⁷ Anti-colonial movements have relied upon strong transnational links that transcended the realms of individual colonial powers, throughout this century.²⁸ The modern movements for women's suffrage and women's rights have always been transnational.²⁹ And, of course, in the beginning "internationalism" was simply "labor internationalism."³⁰

In the current period of transition egalitarian social movements, now, almost always involving transnational links, have played demonstrably significant roles in the development of the social order connecting the industrialized OECD core to the dependent third world and to semi-peripheral societies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.³¹ Democracy movements

²⁶See especially Murphy (1998a).

²⁷Steve Charnovitz (1997) Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 18(2): 192-3; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), pp. 41-51. Paul Goodman (1998) *Of One Blood: Abolitionism and the Origin of Racial Equality* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

²⁸Franz Ansprenger (1989) *The Dissolution of Colonial Empires* (London: Routledge); S. Neil MacFarlane (1985) *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press); Julius Nyerere (1980) Introduction to Mason Sears, *Years of High Purpose, from Trusteeship to Nationhood* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America).

²⁹Keck and Sikkink (1998), pp. 51-72.

³⁰Cecelia Lynch (1999) The Promise and Problems of Internationalism, *Global Governance*, 5(1): forthcoming; Peter Waterman (1998) *Globalization, Social Movements, and the New Internationalism* (London: Mansell), pp. 14-44.

³¹I question whether "globalization" has incorporated China and India into the "universal" industrial market system that seems to be the emergent successor to the "Free World" and "Soviet" social orders of the last industrial era. I question whether China and India will be incorporated during the emergent Information Age. Pritchett (1995) and the *World Development*

and human rights movements, transnationally linked and often supported by core governments (especially since the mid-1980s) have played a central role in the transformation of Latin American, African, and East European societies, and continue to play significant roles in the remaining few large states that have not made "irreversible" movements toward liberal democracy: China, Indonesia, and Nigeria.³² Similarly, transnationally linked women's movements have been instrumental in transforming the "development" agenda of intergovernmental agencies to one that emphasizes the empowerment of women. At the same time women's movements have linked national struggles for gender equity allowing lessons learned in one area to be applied in others and contributing to the rapid diminution of legal gender discrimination as well as to substantive gains in women's access to income, wealth, job opportunities, and political positions.³³

The influence of these social movements on the verbal commitments of governments and intergovernmental agencies, on the allocation of international aid funds, and on domestic legislation (whether enforced or not) is clear from a number of regional studies. Yet, it is equally clear that neither these movements, nor the "unsuccessful" movements promoting the interests of labor and the third world have been able to reverse trends toward widening income gaps within and across societies. Moreover, as the current global financial crisis demonstrates,

Report 1995 project global trends forward 30 years through a variety of scenarios. Even in the most "optimistic" the vast majority of people in Africa, China, South Asia remain at pre-Industrial Revolution levels of income or lower, which also means that most will remain in rural near-subsistence (i.e., both slightly *below* as well as slightly above subsistence) economies with few concrete connections to larger trading networks. In Africa the deep dependence of all African states on the core powers, international financial institutions, and "charities" of the North assures that Africa's marginalized people will be linked into the "universal" social system. In contrast, China's and India's relative political independence, their lack of reliance on international actors for resources necessary to maintain the state, makes the marginalized periphery of those societies more separate from the "universal" system.

³²Ward et al. (1999); Patricia Chilton (1995) *Mechanics of Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, and the Transformation Processes in Eastern Europe*, in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Felice D. Gaer (1995) *Reality Check: Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations Confront Governments at the United Nations*, *Third World Quarterly*, 16(3): 389-404; perhaps the best discussion of the changes in U.S. foreign policy and the transnational associations fostering democracy that resulted is William I. Robinson (1996) *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

³³Martha Alter Chen (1995) *Engendering World Conferences: The International Women's Movement and the United Nations*, *Third World Quarterly*, 16(3): 477-94; U.N. Development Programme (1995); Amy Higer (1997) *Transnational Movements and World Politics: The International Women's Health Movement and Population Policy*. Doctoral dissertation in the Department of Politics, Brandeis University, Waltham, Ma., May. Robert O'Brien, et al. (1998) *The World Bank and Women's Movements*, in *Complex Multilateralism: The Global Economic Institution -Global Social Movement Nexus*. Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, August.

outside the United States and the European Union conditions hardly encourage the pattern of bulky investments needed to build the Information Age global economy. In large parts of the semi-periphery and the periphery, the former Soviet Union, parts of Latin America and South Asia, and much of Sub-Saharan Africa, a kind of kleptocratic anarchy remains.³⁴

Nonetheless, even today the outlines of the social compromises at the center of the "next world order" may be visible. Temporary resolutions of the fundamental conflicts of industrial societies may emerge from the small victories of the egalitarian social movements that have found political opportunities in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of us who live in industrialized societies are, for example, aware of the way in which the massive entrance of women into the wage labor force has allowed household incomes for most families to remain stable or shrink less dramatically despite the fact that most of the economic growth of the past decades has gone to the top five percent of wage earners.³⁵ In this context the slightly rising incomes and protections for dual incomes working families associated with the "third way" economic policies of Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Italy's post-1996 center-left governments have created a surprisingly strong and broad sense of social legitimacy that has extended even to the business elites regularly interviewed by the International Institute of Management Development and the World Economic Forum.³⁶ As a result we someday may look back on this period as one in which the "victories" of women's movements in the industrialized world help temporarily resolve the fundamental labor conflicts that would otherwise have impeded the emergence of the Information Age.

Similarly, empirical studies of the massive impact of gender-based small-scale lending, primary education for girls, and other elements of the emerging "global consensus" on development that have been fostered by transnationally-connected women's movements suggests that some aspects of "the third world problem" may, without conscious strategic decision, end up being managed by seemingly marginal and "low-cost" gender-related changes in North-South

³⁴Christine B. N. and Sylvia C. Tiwon (1998) *Capital, Crisis, and Chaos: Indonesia and Malaysia in the Era of Globalization*; Jane Dawson (1998) *Egalitarian Responses in Post-Communist Societies: Russia and the Former East Bloc*; William I. Robinson (1998) *Latin America in an Age of Inequality Confronting a New "Utopia,"* all prepared for a conference on "Egalitarian Politics in an Age of Globalization," Brown University, Providence, R.I., December. Abstracts of additional papers on Africa (by Wellington Nyangoni), China (by Marc Blecher), India (by Partha Chatterjee), Korea and Japan (by Katharine Moon), Western Europe (by Joel Krieger), and the United States (by Mark Rupert) suggest a similar pattern.

³⁵Kathryn Larin and Elizabeth McNichol (1997) *Pulling Apart: A State-by-State Analysis of Income Trends* (Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities).

³⁶See Murphy (1999a).

relations.³⁷ The recent wave of "democratization without development" in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe has been more self-consciously supported by some Northern governments (especially the Reagan administration) as a strategy to manage the increasingly fraught North-South relationship, and we may someday also look back on it as part of the historical bloc that maintained the period of relative peace and prosperity associated with the Information Age.³⁸

How to have impact on the next world order

I have argued that one important constraint on the influence of transnational egalitarian social movements may be their perceived role as a primary source of the conflicts that destabilized the earlier period of relative peace and prosperity. The relevant perception is, of course, that of the more powerful social forces -- the "ruling classes" and "ruling states" -- or, to be more operationally specific, the groups that serve as "political parties" (in Gramsci's sense) for the dominant economic interests and states, the groups that effectively articulate the worldviews and political programs followed by powerful nations, international institutions, and individuals. The relevant perception is that of the political movements of the powerful. The table below takes each of the industrial systems that are precursors to the emerging "Global" Market System of the Information Age and gives a shorthand reference to the political movements, or Gramscian "parties" of the powerful who provided the primary set of innovations for each era. The sources of the table are disparate, my own work on the major powers and on the international organization system,³⁹ J. Ann Tickner and Daniel Duedney's analyses of the antebellum United States,⁴⁰ and "Amsterdam School" analysts Henk Overbeek and Kees van der Pijl's accounts of British, European, and trans-Atlantic social movements in relation to the emergence of industrial orders.⁴¹

³⁷Tim Evans (1998) Bangladesh Country Report. Global Health Equity Initiative, Social Determinants Project, Santa Fe, N.M., October; Linda Mayoux (1995) From Vicious To Virtuous Circles? Gender and Micro-Enterprise Development. UNRISD UN Fourth World Conference On Women Occasional Paper No. 3, Geneva, May.

³⁸See Augelli and Murphy (1993).

³⁹Murphy (1994) and (1998a).

⁴⁰Tickner (1987) and Daniel Duedney (1996) Building Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Conflicts in Philadelphian Systems, in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

⁴¹Overbeek (1990) and van der Pijl (1998).

Late Industrial Revolution Britain	William Pitt the Younger's Conservatives
Railway Age British Empire	Disraeli's Conservatives
Railway Age German Customs Union	List's German Nationalists
Railway Age American "States Union"	"Hamiltonian" Jeffersonians (ala Tickner)
Second Industrial Revolution Inter-Imperial System	Large-enterprise German liberals, Rhodes's liberal imperialists
Second Industrial Revolution Pan-American System	American "Progressives," McKinley, TR
Automobile Age "Free World" System (OECD and dependent third world)	New Deal Liberals, Ford, Keynes, Monet
Soviet Industrial System	Lenin, Stalin, Bolsheviks

Table 4: Dominant innovators associated with industrial orders

In many of these cases the social movements of the powerful acted as political leaders promoting institutional innovations that had earlier been articulated by "cadre class" civil servants and their political parties or party factions of the democratic left. The forces that maintain this class "dedicated" to resolving social conflicts assure that there is at least one source of the innovations needed to resolve the periodic crises of a conflict-ridden, globalizing industrial capitalism, just the ever growing relative power of the capitalist class (partially as mediated through powerful states), provides the "selection mechanism" that determines which innovations will be institutionalized, thus providing the two necessary parts of any evolutionary explanation.⁴²

Yet the periodic need for social-conflict-resolving and globalizing institutional innovation also creates political opportunities for social movements that are more firmly connected to egalitarian goals than the left-sympathetic "experts in government" may be. To act effectively within this arena the history of

⁴²Murphy (1994), pp. 35-37.

successful egalitarian social movements suggest that they need to include at least four elements in their strategic mix:

First, a dedication to what John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos call "model mongering," meaning the constant, experimental promotion of an ever-growing array of possible (egalitarian) solutions to the conflict and globalization problems faced by governments and powerful social forces.⁴³ For example, small-scale gender-based lending, reproductive freedom, primary education for women, and other elements of a quarter-century old Women in Development agenda have been well "mongered" across a host of institutions whose primary concerns are not gender equality, but who have become convinced that these programs will reduce poverty, minimize costs of development assistance, placate an increasingly powerful Northern women's constituency, help clean up the environment, etc.

Second, to be able to both successfully innovate in the interests of less-advantaged groups and to sell those innovations to status quo-oriented institutions requires a division of labor within the social movement into more and less radical elements *that maintain active cooperation with one another*. Amy Higer notes the importance of this element in the success of the International Women's Health Movement and similar conclusions have been drawn about nineteenth-century anti-slavery movements.⁴⁴

Third, a unified central cadre of activists operating across the regional lines separating the emerging, more global industrial system. Again Higer's account of the International Women's Health Movement, historical accounts of anti-slavery movements, and the experience of nineteenth-century labor internationalism and twentieth-century anticolonialism make this point. To go back even further to the very beginning of the social movement era, one might argue that any successful movement needs its Thomas Paine's, men and women who act in relation to a number of states and who can temporarily help protect the egalitarian activists of one society by offering sanctuary or marshaling diplomatic pressure from another.

Fourth, a willingness and ability to learn of local movements in one part of the new "globalized" region to learn from the experience of local movements in other regions. Again, this seems to be a key element of the success of contemporary women's, democracy, and human rights movements, perhaps in sharp contrast to labor and third world movements which have been riven by regional

⁴³John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos (1998) *Global Business Regulation*. Unpublished book manuscript. Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 549-71.

⁴⁴Higer (1997); Goodman (1998).

differences and perceptions that fundamental differences in interests (say, between industrial workers in Bangladesh and industrial workers in the U.S. or between Africa and Latin America) make cooperative learning impossible.

One of the strongest pieces of evidence supporting both the third and fourth points comes from the response of status-quo powers to the international conference system and especially to the NGO forums that now regularly take place alongside the intergovernmental meetings on the rotating list of major topics (e.g., human rights, the environment, women, population, social development). There is a widespread belief among NGO participants that the NGO forums serve as a major venue for inter-regional learning as well as the primary locus for the development of a transnational cadre linking various regional social movements. And, in fact, the belief in the efficacy of the NGO conferences for exactly that purpose has been a primary motivation for the work of conservative forces within the United States to end of the global conference system.⁴⁵

The fifth and final issue is related: Successful egalitarian social movements have been those willing to marshal the albeit limited powers of "international" organizations to promote and test the movements proposed institutional reforms. Again, contemporary democracy and human rights movements, which have added forms of political conditionality to intergovernmental development assistance and have convinced the central organs of the U.N. to be service-providers to almost every state involved in a democratic transition, illustrate the point.⁴⁶

Other Views of the Role of Egalitarian Social Movements

Here I have been making the case that egalitarian social movements can play and have played a central role in the transition from one industrial system or industrial social order to the next. The particular I am making corresponds in broad outline, although not necessarily in details, with arguments made by other Gramscian analysts of international relations and international history⁴⁷ and by

⁴⁵Jacques Fomerand (1996) U.N. Conferences: Media Events or Genuine Diplomacy? *Global Governance* 2(3): 361-77.

⁴⁶Georg Sørensen, ed. (1993) *Political Conditionally* (London: Frank Cass); Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995) Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative, *Global Governance* 1(1): 3-12. Christopher Joyner (1999) The United Nations and Democracy *Global Governance* 5(3), forthcoming.

⁴⁷A group which includes a number of Italian historians rarely discussed in Anglophone international relations, as well as, I believe, Gramsci himself in parts of his *Prison Notebooks* that were not translated in the most widely-used English-language selections, perhaps due to the statist focus of the political movement that sponsored their translation, see Craig N. Murphy (1998b) Understanding IR: understanding Gramsci *Review of International Studies* 24(4): 421-4.

some other more critical writers on international political economy and modern social movements such as Phil Cerny.⁴⁸ The argument is also essentially congruent with that of transnational business law theorists John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos whose immersion in works of critical legal studies, critical international political economy, and mainstream studies of management history and the history of international institutions is similar to intellectual background of this perspective.⁴⁹

However, the perspective differs in significant ways from those of many scholars who have longer and deeper knowledge of social movements in general and transnational social movements in particular. Most prominent is Sidney Tarrow who remains relatively skeptical of the potential impact of today's transnational movements due in large part to the remaining centrality of state power and, thus, the likelihood that the nation-state will remain the primary arena and object of effective social movement activity.⁵⁰ Moreover, Tarrow's research leads him to see a weaker connection between changes in the economic structure of industrial societies and the opening of opportunities for social movements. He, for example, sees only two "waves" of social movement "contention." They do, in fact, correspond to the waning years of the "thrive" periods of the Railway Age and the Automobile Age, respectively, but Tarrow sees no similar peak between them in (say) the 1890s and 1900s,⁵¹

Other analysts with slightly different operational definitions do see that peak as well.⁵² Similarly it is possible that had Tarrow considered a slightly different range of cases his appreciation of the influence of historical social movements might be different. Tarrow wears the blinders of a Europe-focused comparativist (just as I wear the blinders of a "globalist"). He does not include anticolonial and antislavery movements as part of his subject and has a tendency to treat what I would consider integrating international communities (the Germany of the Customs Union, the antebellum United States, the Italian state system) as if they were already the nation-states that they would become.

⁴⁸This is for the not-surprising reason that Cerny and I have shared insights throughout our current research. See Philip G. Cerny (1997) *A Theory of Transnational Structuration*. Prepared for the Conference on Non-State Actors and Authority in the International System, University of Warwick, November.

⁴⁹Braithwaite and Drahos (1998).

⁵⁰Tarrow (1998), pp. 176-210.

⁵¹Tarrow (1998), pp. 150-7.

⁵²Karl-Werner Brand (1990) *Cyclical Aspects of New Social Movements: Waves of Cultural Criticism and Mobilization Cycles of New Middle-Class Radicalism*, in Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, eds *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Somewhat at the other extreme, Peter Waterman, whose extensive, transnational, primary research on the activities of contemporary egalitarian social movements seems to me to overplay the extent to which they can transform world society. In part, I believe that this is because Waterman overestimates the degree to which this era of globalization has undermined the power of nation-states. In another context -- as critique of the *immediate* relevance of the political program of "cosmopolitan democracy" in most parts of the world -- I have argued, similarly to Tarrow, that (perhaps with the exception of inside the European Union) the continued power of the nation-state will make it the *primary* relevant target of egalitarian politics throughout the next industrial era.⁵³

Something of Waterman's optimism is shared by the less radical scholars -- many of them associated with the Stanford Sociology Department -- who see the increasing emergence of a "world polity" in the period since the Industrial Revolution.⁵⁴ They have provided the most-comprehensive and reliable long-term picture of the activities of all forms of transnational social movements, not just those concerned with egalitarian goals. Yet, they seem to me to overplay the movements' significance and underplay the ongoing sources of political contention -- rooted in fundamental differences in interests -- that Tarrow's perspective allows us to see. The world polity scholars do, I believe, recognize an important global trend in the growing ubiquity of liberal ideals as a governing ideology. Their work has important links to arguments about "the democratic peace" and to broad area in which Smithian and Kantian arguments about international politics are valid, but just as there are some important reasons why all places cannot become democracies,⁵⁵ so there are important impediments to emergence of a global liberal polity.

Often the international relations scholars who have examined transnational egalitarian social movements in much more detail than I are concerned with a much broader or else a much narrower set of impacts on world society. The scholars inspired by Elise Boulding who have worked with Jackie Smith and her collaborators examine a much broader range of potentially progressive impacts. Rather than being concerned primarily with the influence of movements on innovations in world order they are also concerned with the ways in which social movement NGOs have come to provide transnational services and the ways in which they work for the long-term transformation of social values (one of the

⁵³Craig N. Murphy (1997) Prospects for Cosmopolitan Democracy. *The Forum of the Democratic Leaders in the Asia-Pacific Quarterly* 3(3): 12. This is not to gainsay the intellectual and political importance of the project of cosmopolitan democracy which I firmly believe is probably the most relevant form of political theory in our age.

⁵⁴John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds (1999) *Constructing World Culture; International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

⁵⁵See note 5 above.

characteristic modes of political action highlighted in the "New Social Movements" literature in comparative politics.⁵⁶ Where the broader research agenda of Smith's group overlaps with narrower questions that I wish to ask, their findings, especially about effective strategies, fit with the arguments made here.

Another exemplary project, by Robert O'Brien and his colleagues,⁵⁷ provides us with the clearest and most comprehensive comparative picture of the workings of some contemporary egalitarian social movements (women's movements, labor movements, and human rights movements) with the most powerful intergovernmental agencies whose roles in promoting and enforcing a fundamentalist liberal internationalist vision may do a great deal to thwart egalitarian goals (i.e., the World Bank, World Trade Organization, and IMF). The conclusions of this project about the efficacy of the movements relative to this part of the current international organization system inform my understanding of the longer historical pattern.

Finally, there are exemplary studies of transnational egalitarian social movements whose object differs from mine. Martha E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink look at the impact of human rights and women's groups in a series of specific campaigns with specific limited objects in order to reach generalizations about their impact on the shifting norms of international society. Their focus is derived in part from the literature on New Social Movements that emphasizes cultural or normative change as the distinctive mode of social movement politics.⁵⁸ The implicit bargains between conflictual social forces that help constitute historical blocs are not their focus. Nonetheless, as is also the case with that work by Jackie Smith and her collaborators that focuses on modes of impact other than those I emphasize here, the Keck and Sikkink's detailed historical studies do not contradict the argument about the evolution of the global political economy made here.

Undoubtedly many scholars interested in developing greater understanding of the impact of transnational egalitarian social movements will not share either my concern with the evolution of the global political economy or my conviction about the usefulness of the similar Gramscian and world system's accounts of that history. Nonetheless, even leaving those interests and convictions aside, I believe there may be lessons in the approach proposed here that would be useful to other empirically-oriented scholars. The hypotheses advanced (and

⁵⁶Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds (1997) *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press).

⁵⁷O'Brien (1998).

⁵⁸Keck and Sikkink (1998)

sometimes supported) here can be understood as an attempt to extend key parts of Tarrow's political opportunity structure (POS) approach to studies of politics at the domestic and the transnational levels *simultaneously*. Understood broadly to refer to the whole range of "signals to social and political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements"⁵⁹ POS introduces increasingly sophisticated analytical tools to study the degree of openness of a system of domestic or global governance to interventions by social movement actors. It attempts to operationalize and analyze the way in which political systems structure the mobilizational capacity, shape the behavior and goals, and condition the success of movements.

The domestic social movement literature tends to emphasize distinctive national cleavage structures (existing patterns of political conflict), institutional arrangements, and alliance patterns emanating from the political system,⁶⁰ implying distinctive national patterns of social movement mobilization. Where similarities in the patterned behavior are observed among women's movements or environmental movements, for example, these are attributed to common policy agendas and goals or the emulation of strategy and leadership across national boundaries. In that domestic literature little attention is paid to structural attributes of the international system or to direct transnational links between domestic social movements or to the interactive role of transnational and domestic social movements operating in the same policy arena. By neglecting the international dimension, the domestic POS approach thus far reifies the increasingly problematic distinction between domestic and international politics, obscures any potential interactive influences of domestic and international opportunity structures on social movements, and ignores any potential organizational links between domestic and transnational social movements.

What is needed is to further develop a POS approach to integrate interorganizational relations in the NGO realm and global alliance and cleavage structures into the conceptual framework. It would be useful to develop and apply what might be called a transnational opportunity structure (TOS) approach to a set of critical research questions:

- How significant are the demonstration effects of transnational social movements on domestic social movements and vice versa?
- How important are transnational links between national and transnational social movements?

⁵⁹Tarrow (1998), p. 7.

⁶⁰Hanspeter Kriesi, et al. (1995) *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

- Why do the "maps" of domestic social movements and that of international social movements differ?
- Why do some issues become more a focus of concern at the international rather than the domestic level and vice versa?
- Can the relative salience of social movements -- and specific organizational and strategic attributes -- be better explained by nationally-specific opportunity structures that tend to affect all social movements across policy domains or policy-specific transnational opportunity structures?

Ultimately, I believe the answers to many of these questions will be linked back to the evolution of the global political economy, to the process of "globalization" and to the fundamental conflicts of industrial societies. Nonetheless, research adopting a TOS approach should not begin with that assumption. And it should not begin with that assumption if that collaborative endeavor hopes organize the united effort of the wide range of scholars doing creative empirical research on the political impact of today's transnational organizations.